Contemporary interpreters have entered a new debate over Aquinas’s view on the status of human beings or persons between death and resurrection. Everyone agrees that, for Aquinas, separated souls exist in the interim. The disagreement concerns what happens to human beings—Peter, Paul, and so on. According to corruptionists, Aquinas thought human beings cease to exist at death and only begin to exist again at the resurrection. According to survivalists, however, Aquinas thought human beings continue to exist in the interim, constituted (...) by their separated souls alone. In this paper I offer a new argument in favor of corruptionism based upon Aquinas’s repeated discussions of a central though so far neglected topic: the death of Christ. To the question, “Was Christ a human being during the three days of his death?” Aquinas always answered, “No.” Examining his reasons proves that corruptionism, and not survivalism, is the right interpretation of Aquinas. (shrink)

There is an important debate underway concerning Aquinas’s view about the status of persons in the interim period between death and resurrection. According to corruptionists, Aquinas believed that the person ceases to exist at death and only begins to exist again at the resurrection. Survivalists, on the other hand, deny this. According to them, the continued existence of the soul in the interim period between death and resurrection is sufficient for the continued existence of the person. One objection raised by (...) survivalists against corruptionism concerns Aquinas’s supposed rejection of the metaphysical possibility of intermittent or “gappy” existence. In this paper I reply to this objection in defense of corruptionism, arguing that Aquinas explicitly endorses the possibility of intermittent existence, that none of the texts cited against corruptionism in fact prove otherwise, and that Aquinas’s silence about the matter in his discussions of the resurrection can be easily explained. (shrink)

This article explores the strategies available for defending Aquinas’s view of existence in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. The rival view of existence prevalent among contemporary analytic philosophers is subject to serious objections. At the same time, the main contemporary analytic objections to Aquinas’s view can be adequately answered. The widespread use of “exist(s)” to ascribe existence to individuals and objects provides good reason to think that such use makes sense, and analogies like those of Aquinas can help to (...) illustrate the commonsense meaning of “exist(s)” to those who doubt it. The truth of Aquinas’s view of existence as a real property of individuals or objects can be defended at least in principle by appealing to its descriptive and explanatory usefulness. In addition to Aquinas’s own uses of it, there are a number of areas in contemporary analytic metaphysics where his view of existence could likely be of use, such as contemporary essentialism, substance-attribute ontology, and the revival of ontological pluralism. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas was one of the most significant Christian thinkers of the middle ages and ranks among the greatest philosophers and theologians of all time. In the mid-thirteenth century, as a teacher at the University of Paris, Aquinas presided over public university-wide debates on questions that could be put forward by anyone about anything. The Quodlibetal Questions are Aquinas's edited records of these debates. Unlike his other disputed questions, which are limited to a few specific topics such as evil or (...) divine power, Aquinas's Quodlibetal Questions contain his treatment of hundreds of questions on a wide range of topics—from ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion to dogmatic theology, sacramental theology, moral theology, eschatology, and much more. And, unlike his other disputed questions, none of the questions treated in his Quodlibetal Questions were of Aquinas's own choosing—they were all posed for him to answer by those who attended the public debates. As such, this volume provides a window onto the concerns of students, teachers, and other interested parties in and around the university at that time. For the same reason it contains some of Aquinas's fullest, and in certain cases his only, treatments of philosophical and theological questions that have maintained their interest throughout the centuries. (shrink)

The body of Christ is the focus of a range of questions posed to St. Thomas Aquinas by the audiences at the quodlibetal disputations over which he presided at the University of Paris. These questions arise from reflection on the Catholic faith, which holds that the body of Christ is given to us as spiritual food in the sacrament of the altar, the Eucharist. In response to questions about the Eucharist, Aquinas tries to explain how Christ’s body could come to (...) be present in the sacrament by the bread becoming Christ’s body, arguing that by God’s power the substance of Christ’s body can come to be present under the attributes of bread, which can continue to exist without being the attributes of anything. Yet why must this be the answer? Why can’t Christ’s body come to be present with the bread, for instance? Aquinas insists that the bread and Christ’s body never exist together, but he allows that Christ’s glorified body can be with another body in the same place. So, why not in the Eucharist? Or why can’t Christ assume the bread, as he assumed a human nature, thereby making it his body? It might seem unfitting for Christ to have such a non-rational nature, yet that is exactly what Aquinas thinks happened while Christ’s body lay in the tomb. So, why not in the Eucharist? This paper attempts to explain why not. Examining the full range of questions posed to Aquinas about the body of Christ reveals a number of principles that together seem to imply that nothing less than the full transubstantiation of bread into Christ’s body is possible if Christ’s body is to become really present in the Eucharist. (shrink)

Aquinas considers the questions “Does it exist?” and “What is it?” basic to any science in Aristotle’s sense. In his early works, Aquinas claims that we can answer the second question without answering the first, knowing a thing’s essence without knowing whether it exists. This claim is part of a famous argument for the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures, and for the existence of God. But in his later commentaries on Aristotle, Aquinas appears to abandon the claim, (...) insisting that it is impossible to know what something is without knowing whether it exists. What should we make of this apparent contradiction? It is possible that Aquinas simply changed his mind, or that in his later commentaries he is only explaining Aristotle’s view, with which he disagrees. In this paper, however, I defend a third solution based upon Aquinas’s distinction between two ways of knowing what something is—“by means of a definition” and “by means of a proposition.” For Aquinas explains that in the one way we can know a thing’s essence without knowing its existence, and in the other way we cannot. Thus, the apparent contradiction can be resolved by making just such a distinction. Yet understanding this third solution requires an examination of the semantics of definitions and propositions informing Aquinas’s logical approach to essence. Such an examination not only allows us to resolve the apparent contradiction between his works; it also gives us a better understanding of his logical approach to essence. (shrink)

Aquinas often defends the possibility of the resurrection of the dead by appealing to the survival of the human soul between death and resurrection. Contemporary interpreters suppose that Aquinas does so because he thinks the continued existence of the human soul is metaphysically necessary for the identity of human beings over time. If the human soul perished at death along with the human body, then not even God could bring the same human being back to life—so Aquinas is supposed to (...) think. In this paper I argue that this widely held supposition is false. First I present the evidence from a neglected quodlibet question in which Aquinas argues that God can annihilate material substances, which include human beings, and then re-create them numerically the same. This question makes it clear that Aquinas thinks that continuity of nothing other than God’s power is metaphysically necessary for the identity of human beings over time. But this interpretation of Aquinas faces a number of objections. I answer two, one based on Aquinas’s supposed endorsement of the principle of non-repeatability, and another based on his account of the difference between eternal, aeviternal, and temporal existence. (shrink)

Most contemporary interpreters of Aquinas think that he rejects the possibility of intermittent or “gappy” existence. Thus they think that the soul’s natural survival after death is a necessary part of Aquinas’s defense of the possibility of the resurrection. Yet this contemporary consensus rests on shaky foundations. For on the basis of a widely neglected quodlibet question, earlier interpreters of Aquinas as eminent as John Capreolus and Francis Sylvester Ferrara recognized that Aquinas reserves to God the power to annihilate material (...) substances, including human beings, and then re-create them numerically the same. If these earlier interpreters are right, then the contemporary consensus is wrong. But Adam Wood argues that they are not right. He attempts to vindicate the contemporary consensus by offering an alternative reading of Aquinas’s quodlibet on annihilation and re-creation, providing textual evidence of Aquinas’s rejection of the possibility of “gappy” existence, criticizing the reading given to this evidence by Aquinas’s earlier interpreters, and mounting a philosophical case against the possibility of “gappy” existence based on his preferred interpretation of Aquinas’s theory of the principle of individuation. In this paper I come to the defense of Aquinas’s earlier interpreters. Wood’s alternative reading of Aquinas’s quodlibet is impossible to square with the text itself. Close inspection of Wood’s textual evidence shows that some of the readings of Aquinas’s earlier interpreters are much more plausible than Wood allows, making his textual case much weaker than he admits. And his philosophical case against the possibility of “gappy” existence begs the question. (shrink)

Richard Sorabji and Myles Burnyeat have developed and defended rival interpretations of Aristotle’s account of sensation. Both agree in accepting the common terms of Aristotle’s account , but they disagree about how these terms are to be understood. In this paper I consider these rival interpretations, examining the best arguments for each and raising new objections to both. I argue that each contemporary interpretation, in its own way, faces the same problem—the inability to accommodate everything that Aristotle says in his (...) account of sensation. In the search for an alternative interpretation I suggest turning to the medieval tradition, and particularly to the interpretation developed by Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. I argue that Aquinas’s interpretation deserves more attention because it retains the best features of its two contemporary rivals while avoiding the problems facing each. (shrink)

Aquinas consistently criticizes Plato and his followers for their commitment to the existence of separate forms or ideas. There is no whiteness existing by itself apart from any particular white things or any particular person's thoughts about them. The same goes for every natural form, from humanity to heat. And yet Aquinas is happy to appeal to such separate forms as examples to illustrate his own metaphysical views. This seems like a strange and dangerous procedure. If Aquinas considers Platonic forms (...) to be incoherent, then surely their incoherence will infect the notions he uses them to illustrate. But does Aquinas consider Platonic forms to be incoherent? I don't think so. The very fact that he uses them as examples to illustrate his own views suggests otherwise. And at one point Aquinas even grants that God could create a Platonic form such as a separate whiteness. Why, then, does he reject such forms? What has Aquinas got against them? An examination of his main critical discussions of Platonic forms shows that he rejects them not because he thinks they are impossible, but because he thinks they are unnecessary. In other words, Aquinas rejects Platonic forms on grounds of parsimony, since he thinks they cannot explain any of the things that Plato posited them to explain, such as the changes things undergo, the nature and existence of things, and our knowledge of them. Where Plato's separate forms fail, however, Aquinas thinks Aristotle's inherent forms succeed. (shrink)